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THE PENSION MIS-SELLING SCANDAL, THE SEC,  
AND THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD 
 
JOHN A. TURNER* 
 
*** 
A growing literature has documented the low quality of financial advice 
that many people receive because of conflicts of interest that many 
financial advisers have. The Council of Economic Advisers has found 
that bad advice from financial advisers concerning rollovers from 401(k) 
plans to IRAs costs U.S. workers $17 billion a year. When a similar 
situation occurred in the United Kingdom, the situation was termed the 
“pension mis-selling scandal.”  British financial market regulators levied 
billions of pounds in fines on financial service providers to compensate 
pension participants for the bad advice they had received. This paper 
argues that a pension mis-selling scandal is occurring in the United 
States. Despite the fiduciary duty of financial advisers, and the task of the 
SEC to enforce that fiduciary responsibility, the SEC has taken no action 
to protect pension participants relating to advice to roll funds over from 
low-fee 401(k) plans to IRAs, which generally charge higher fees. Even 
in the case of advice to roll funds over from the extremely low-fee Thrift 
Savings Plan for federal government workers (which charges less than 3 
basis points), the SEC has taken no action. This paper compares the 
pension mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom to the situation in the 
United States concerning pension rollovers to IRAs. The paper then 
compares the regulatory response of financial market regulators in the 
United Kingdom to that of the SEC. The main findings of this paper are 
the apparent view of the SEC that fees in the context of pension rollovers 
are not an important issue, and the related finding that there has been a 
lack of action by the SEC concerning pension mis-selling in the United 
States. These findings are both consistent with the hypothesis of 
regulatory capture of the SEC.  Because the fiduciary standard of the 
SEC is weak, extending it to broker-dealers will have limited effect. 
*** 
                                                                                                                 
*I received helpful comments from participants at the Fifth Annual National 
Benefits and Social Insurance Conference at the University of Connecticut, from 
participants at a seminar of the Savings and Retirement Foundation in Washington, 
DC, and from Benjamin Jones. 
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“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect 
investors. . . .”1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the job of 
protecting U.S. investors in financial markets.2 One way it does that is to 
regulate the services provided by Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs). 
RIAs have a fiduciary duty to provide advice that is in the best interest of 
their clients.3 However, one problem clients encounter is called “hat 
switching.”4 With “hat switching,” an adviser sometimes acts as an RIA with 
a fiduciary duty, and sometimes acts as a broker-dealer, with a suitability 
duty, which is a lower standard. Broker-dealers are regulated by the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  Under the suitability 
standard, advice, rather than being in the best interest of the client, must 
merely be suitable for the client, given the client’s age, income and assets, 
risk preferences, and other factors.5 For this and other reasons, it may be 
difficult for clients to determine what standard of regulatory protection, if 
any, applies to the advice they are receiving.6 The SEC has been considering 
extending its fiduciary standard to broker-dealers.7 
RIAs advise some workers relating to their pensions, which for 
many people are their primary or only form of financial market investment. 
While only 13.8 percent of households directly held stocks in 2013, 49.2 
percent of households held retirement accounts, primarily Individual 
                                                                                                                 
1 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do (2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
2 Id. 
3 Peter Lazaroff, The Difference Between Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 
FORBES (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterlazaroff/2016/04/06/the-
difference-between-fiduciary-and-suitability-standards/#4d42e9a735bf. 
4 John A. Turner & Dana M. Muir, The Market for Financial Advisors 13-45 
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smetters, eds., 2013). 
5 Lazroff, supra note 3. 
6 Angela A. Hung et al., Investor and Industry Perspectives on Investment 
Advisors and Broker-Dealers, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST. (2008) 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf. 
7 John Manganaro, Optimizing Your Practice to Capture Rollovers, Plan 
Adviser (Mar. 28, 2014) http://www.planadviser.com/Optimizing_Your_Practice 
_to_Capture_Rollovers.aspx.  
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Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans.8 When employees with a 
401(k) plan, or with a similar type of defined contribution plan, terminate 
employment, they generally have the options of leaving the money in the 
retirement fund of the former employer, cashing out the account, transferring 
the money to the plan or another employer, or transferring the money to an 
Individual Retirement Account (IRA).9  
Because many people lack financial sophistication, when they 
change jobs or retire they seek the advice of investment advisers about how 
to invest the assets in their employer-sponsored retirement 
accounts.10  Because of the way the adviser is compensated, the advice that 
yields the adviser the most income is not always the best advice for the client. 
According to one adviser, “…you come to believe what is in your interest to 
believe; your objectivity and professional judgment is always at risk of being 
compromised if you put yourself in a conflicted situation where your 
interests are not 100% aligned with your client’s.”11 
Financial advisers who earn fees based on the amount of assets they 
manage may advise rolling over pension assets into an IRA because that will 
yield greater income for the adviser. The situation of financially illiterate 
clients interacting with advisers who have a conflict of interest generally 
creates the potential for an agency problem, in which the agent or adviser 
may not act in the best interest of the client.12  
                                                                                                                 
8 Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010-2013: 
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 100 FED. RES. BULL. 4 (Sept. 
2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2014/pdf/scf14.pdf. 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. PRIV. PENSION PLAN BULL., 
ABSTRACT OF 2013 FORM 5500 ANN. REP. (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ebsa/researchers/statistics/retirement-
bulletins/2013pensionplanbulletin.pdf. 
10 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of 
Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 25 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1, 5-44 (Mar. 
2014), http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.52.1.5; David M. 
Abbey & Brian Reid, INV. CO. INST., The Role of IRAs is U.S. Households’ Saving 
for Retirement 2014, http://www.ici.org/pdf/15_ici_omb_data.pdf. 
11 Christopher Carosa, Exclusive Interview: Clark Blackman II Says SEC 
Fiduciary Fix ‘Not Tough Stuff’; Proposed DOL Fiduciary Rule a “Band-Aid”, 
FIDUCIARYNEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2015/12/ 
exclusive-interview-clark-blackman-ii-says-sec-fiduciary-fix-not-tough-stuff-
proposed-dol-fiduciary-rule-a-band-aid/. 
12 John A. Turner, Bruce W. Klein, & Norman P. Stein, Financial Illiteracy 
Meets Conflicted Advice: The Case of Thrift Savings Plan Rollovers, 3 J. 
RETIREMENT 47 (2016). 
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In advising a client on whether to roll funds over to an IRA, an RIA 
has a conflict of interest, even if the adviser charges by the hour, rather than 
by assets under management. If the adviser advises the client to stay with the 
401(k) plan, the adviser will receive a one-time fee for that advice. But if the 
adviser advises the client to roll funds over to an IRA that he or she manages, 
the adviser will receive a continuing stream of advisory fees, which can be 
as much as two percent of assets under management,13 though more 
generally they are around one percent.14 Thus, the adviser’s incentive to 
advise a client to roll over his or her 401(k) plan to an IRA can be substantial. 
Employees often wrongly assume that they are receiving objective advice, 
that they have fiduciary protection concerning the advice they receive, and 
that the adviser has their best interests at heart. One survey found that 42 
percent of investors thought that broker-dealers have a fiduciary duty to their 
clients, which is incorrect.15 
This paper raises an issue that when it occurred in the United 
Kingdom was called the “pension mis-selling scandal.”16  It presents the case 
that pension mis-selling has occurred in the United States as well. The paper 
applies the economic theory of agency to analyze the regulation of the market 
for financial advice by the SEC. It does so by focusing on pension rollovers 
to IRAs. It compares the role of the SEC in protecting pension participants 
in the United States when they receive bad advice from financial advisers to 
the actions taken by British financial market regulators following the 
pensions mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, it discusses the literature 
relating to financial advice and regulatory protections. Second, it documents 
that pension rollovers play a key role in the U.S. retirement income system, 
causing IRAs to have more assets than either 401(k) plans or defined benefit 
plans. Third, it presents evidence that these rollovers are often not in the best 
interest of workers, in part because of the higher fees attached to IRAs, but 
also because of the loss of fiduciary protections. Fourth, it discusses an 
extreme example of bad advice, which relates to rollovers from the Thrift 
                                                                                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Intro: Average Financial Advisor Fees in 2016: Full Details on Advisory & 
Investment Management Fees (Comparison), ADVISORYHQ (2016), 
http://www.advisoryhq.com/articles/financial-advisor-fees-wealth-managers-
planners-and-fee-only-advisors/#Percentage-AUM. 
15 Hung et al. supra note 6, at 10. 
16 Sue Ward, Personal Pensions in the UK, the Mis-Selling Scandal and the 
Lessons to be Learnt 139-146 (Gerard Hughes & Jim Steward eds., 2000). 
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Savings Plan for federal government workers, a plan that charges extremely 
low fees of less than 3 basis points. Fifth, it compares the lack of action by 
the SEC with the regulatory response of the U.K. financial markets 
regulators. It also presents evidence that the SEC has not considered fees 
charged for rollovers to be an important issue, despite a Council of Economic 
Advisers study indicating that bad advice about making pension rollovers is 
costing U.S. pension participants $17 billion a year. Last, the paper draws 
conclusions concerning the protection the SEC provides to U.S. pension 
investors. 
 
II.  LITERATURE 
Three approaches have been taken in law to deal with conflicts of 
interest: (1) prohibition, (2) disclosure, and (3) the fiduciary standard. With 
prohibition, conflicts of interest are not allowed. With disclosure, conflicts 
of interest are allowed, but the adviser must disclose these conflicts of 
interest. With the fiduciary standard, conflicts of interest may be allowed, 
but the adviser is prohibited from acting on them.17  
The law and economics literature discusses the role of a fiduciary 
standard as one way of dealing with the “agency problem”: a problem in 
which the agent has a conflict of interest and superior knowledge, and it is 
difficult for the client to assess the advice of the agent.18  Because of low 
levels of financial literacy among pension participants, financial advisers 
(the agents) have superior knowledge over pension plan participants. To deal 
with the potential for bad advice, with the fiduciary standard, the agent is 
supposed to act solely in the best interest of the client. However, clients have 
a lack of financial sophistication and thus are unable to evaluate the quality 
of the advice they receive. For this reason, they play a weak role in helping 
regulators enforce the financial market regulations that supposedly protect 
them.  
 A fourth approach in public policy for dealing with conflicts of 
interest is to provide financial education that leads to financial literacy. 
Presumably, financially literate investors will be less susceptible to bad 
advice. 
 People who are not financially literate often are not able to evaluate 
the quality of advice they receive. The Australian financial markets regulator 
did a study that rated the quality of financial advice that people received. Out 
                                                                                                                 
17 Turner & Muir, supra note 4.  
18 Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1039, 1041-55 (2011). 
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of 64 cases reviewed, it found that only two people received what it 
considered to be high-quality financial advice. The majority (37 people) 
received adequate advice, while a significant minority (25 people) received 
poor quality advice—i.e., advice that was inappropriate for their situation.19 
Yet in the Australian study, most people who received poor advice thought 
that they had received good advice.20  This phenomenon makes it difficult 
for regulators to counteract poor quality advice. 
 Turner, Klein, and Stein document that some advisers with a 
fiduciary duty are advising participants in the Thrift Savings Plan for federal 
government workers to roll their funds over to higher-fee IRAs.21 The Thrift 
Savings Plan charges the lowest fees of any 401(k)-type plan in the United 
States, less than three basis points per year.  
This paper documents that the SEC has not taken a role in protecting 
American pension participants concerning pension mis-selling, whereas the 
British financial regulators have stepped in and done so. The literature 
relating to the pension mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom is 
discussed later.  
One possible explanation for the inaction of the SEC is “regulatory 
capture.” Regulatory capture refers to the regulated industry so influencing 
the regulator that the regulator does a poor job in protecting the public. 
Woodward and Etzioni discuss the issue of the regulatory capture of the 
SEC.22 Gadinis presents evidence as to the weak enforcement of cases by the 
SEC against large banks and brokerage firms.23 The article demonstrates a 
                                                                                                                 
19 Peter Kell, The Future of Financial Advice Post FOFA (2012), 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/Future-of-advice-post-
FoFA.pdf/$file/Future-of- advice-post-FoFA.pdf. 
20 Id. 
21 Turner, Klein & Stein, supra note 12 at 47. 
22 SUSAN E. WOODWARD, REGULATORY CAPTURE AT THE U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION in JAMES R. BARTH, R. DAN BRUNBAUGH, JR., & GLENN 
YAGO, EDS., RESTRUCTURING REGULATION AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, (The 
Milken Institute Series on Financial Innovations and Growth, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 2000), http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mAHsmzdUbs 
IC&oi=fnd&pg=PA99&dq=regulatory+capture+of+the+SEC&ots=lL-
K2zHvG3&sig=cRYeKtvws3yHw9EdiAWpsiPjkHk#v=onepage&q=regulatory%2
0capture%20of%20the%20SEC&f=false; Amitai Etzioni, The Capture Theory of 
Regulations – Revisited, 46 SOC’Y 319 (2009), http://www2.gwu.edu/~ccps/ 
etzioni/documents/A400%20Society,%20Capture.pdf. 
23 Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from 
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67(3) BUSINESS LAWYER 679 (2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333717. 
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systematic lack of action against individual violators in high-profile cases. 
As far as we are able to determine, the SEC has never filed a case concerning 
advice about pension rollovers, despite those rollovers sometimes involving 
large increases in fees.   
The International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS 2015) 
argues that pension mis-selling is more likely to occur in countries with 
relatively little regulation on competition in financial markets. For the 
purposes of our paper, whether or not the inaction by the SEC is due to 
regulatory capture is a secondary issue. The main issue is the failure of the 
SEC to act to deal with pension mis-selling in the United States. 
 
III.  PENSION MIS-SELLING IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) has quantified the cost of 
pension mis-selling in the United States. It finds that conflicted advice costs 
participants in IRAs $17 billion a year.24  That amount comprises not only 
excess fees but also lower investment returns compared to what investors 
would have received in net rates of return had they not been advised to roll 
their funds over to an IRA. Thus, pension mis-selling is one reason for the 
shortfall of retirement savings in the United States. A large amount of this 
loss, and the underlying reason for why it is occurring, relates to the higher 
fees earned by the financial services industry.  
 Supporting the conclusions of the CEA, a recent study in 2015 by 
Munnell, Aubrey and Crawford finds that IRAs tend to receive net rates of 
return that are about 1 percentage point less than those of employer-provided 
defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans.25 This result is largely due 
to a difference in fees, but it is also due to differences in asset allocation. A 
higher percentage of assets in IRAs is invested in money market funds, 
which would seem to be a poor investment choice for retirement savings. 
 The CEA estimate takes into account increased trading costs and 
increased administrative fees compared to a 401(k) plan, but it does not 
factor in that a person in an IRA is more likely to pay a financial adviser for 
                                                                                                                 
24 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, The Effects of 
Conflicted Investment Savings (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf. 
25 Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubrey & Caroline V. Crawford, Investment 
Returns: Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Plans, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT 
B.C., Issue Brief no. 15-21 (Dec. 2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/IB_15-21.pdf. 
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ongoing investment management services than a person in a 401(k) plan. 
Thus, in that respect, it understates the loss. 
 The bad advice, as well as being costly in the aggregate, is costly at 
the individual level. A person who receives advice from a financial adviser 
who has a conflict of interest in advising that person to roll over a 401(k) 
account to an IRA at retirement will lose, on average, an estimated 12 percent 
of his or her savings when those savings are drawn down over 30 years—not 
taking into account fees charged by investment advisers.26  
 Bad outcomes as a result of bad financial advice generally require a 
combination of three factors operating simultaneously. First, the pension 
participant has a low level of financial literacy—in particular, not 
understanding the importance of the difference in fees between different 
financial products. Second, the financial adviser has a conflict of interest in 
that the advice that yields him the most income is not the best advice for the 
pension participant. Third, the regulatory protections are weak or the 
enforcement of regulations is weak. 
 Even bad advice needs to be supported by some argument. One of 
the main arguments financial advisers make for rolling over a 401(k) pension 
account to an IRA is that the IRA holder has a much larger range of 
investment options.27 However, a substantial literature demonstrates that the 
cognitive costs of greater choice can lead to worse savings and retirement 
investment choices.28 The evidence presented by Munnell, Aubrey, and 
Crawford concerning IRA investments in money market funds supports the 
idea that the larger range of options does not necessarily have a positive 
effect.29 In addition, Shen and Turner demonstrate that the small number of 
                                                                                                                 
26 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 24. 
27 Turner, Klein & Stein, supra note 12. 
28 See Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan & Wesley Yin, Tying Odysseus to the Mast: 
Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines, 121(2) Q.J. OF 
ECON. 635 (2016), http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25098802.pdf; Brigitte C. 
Madrian & Dennis Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation 
and Savings Behavior, 116(4) Q.J. OF ECON. 1149, 1180-1182 (2001), 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/stable/pdf/2696456.pdf; Fabian Duarte 
& Justine Hastings, Fettered Consumers and Sophisticated Firms: Evidence from 
Mexico’s Privatized Social Security System, Yale U. Dep’t of Econ. (Oct. 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers_files/orrc09-
04/orrc09-04.pdf; Justine Hastings & Lydia Tejeda-Ashton, Financial Literacy, 
Information and Demand Elasticity: Survey and Experimental Evidence from 
Mexico (NBER Working Paper No. 14538, 2008), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w14538.pdf. (Choi et al. 2006, 2007) 
29 See Munnell, Aubrey & Crawford, supra note 25, at 6. 
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options in the Thrift Savings Plan for federal government workers, the 
military, and members of Congress (five basic options) permit a high degree 
of portfolio diversification.30 Furthermore, section 404(c) of ERISA requires 
that 401(k) plans must provide a sufficient range of choices to pension 
participants to allow them to select an adequately diversified portfolio.31 
 IRAs are the largest type of pension plan in the United States, having 
overtaken 401(k) plans. Rollovers are the primary source of funding for 
IRAs, as relatively few people contribute to IRAs.32 In a rollover, the person 
receives a check from the pension plan of a former employer, then deposits 
the check with the IRA. In a transfer, the pension plan sends the check 
directly to the IRA. We follow common practice and refer to both as 
rollovers.  
 Because of the importance of the rollover decision, many people 
seek financial advice. One survey finds that 61 percent of the people with 
rollover IRAs received advice from a financial adviser before making the 
rollover.33 This compares to 38 percent of families who reported obtaining 
information about investing from bankers, brokers, or other sellers of 
financial services, and 31.3 percent of families who reported obtaining 
information from lawyers, accountants, or other financial advisers.34 Thus, 
rollovers are a financial decision in which advice is particularly prevalent. 
 The frequency of rollovers is surprising because studies have 
documented the tendency for pension participants to exhibit inertia.35 Inertia 
                                                                                                                 
30 Sally Shen & John A. Turner, Analyzing the Quality of Financial Advice: Do 
Conflicted Advisers Tell Half Truths? (Pension Pol. Ctr., Working Paper May 2016), 
http://www.busman.qmul.ac.uk/newsandevents/EventDocuments/BFWG%20Conf
erence%20Papers%202016/ 177059.pdf. 
31 Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §404(c), 88 
Stat. 829 (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. (2015)). 
32 David M. Abbey & Brian Reid, INV. CO. INST., The Role of IRAs is U.S. 
Households’ Saving for Retirement 2014, http://www.ici.org/pdf/15_ici_omb_ 
data.pdf. 
33 Id. 
34 Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010-2013: 
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL. 100(4) (Sept. 
2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2014/pdf/scf14.pdf. 
35 John Manganaro, Optimizing Your Practice to Capture Rollovers, Plan 
Adviser, (March 28), http://www.planadviser.com/Optimizing_Your_Practice_to_ 
Capture_Rollovers.aspx; See also James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution 
Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance 16, 67-
113 (2002). But see Leslie A. Muller & John A. Turner, The Persistence of Employee 
401(k) Contributions Over a Major Stock Market Cycle: The Limited Power of 
Inertia 3, 51- 65 (2013).  
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would cause participants to leave their 401(k) accounts with their former 
employers because that is the “path of least resistance.” The rollover trend is 
inconsistent with participant inertia because it requires an action by 
participants.  Most analysis in behavioral economics concerning retirement 
focuses on why people do not do something—they do not annuitize, some 
do not participate in 401(k) plans offering an employer match or, if they do 
participate, do not contribute sufficiently to receive the maximum matching 
contribution.  However, the study of why clients make rollovers involves the 
opposite tendency—a question of why people are doing something. 
Because of concerns that rollovers are being driven by faulty advice, 
the Department of Labor (DOL), the SEC, and FINRA have all considered 
regulatory action,36 and in 2016 the DOL released major new regulations 
concerning financial advice received by pension participants.37 The SEC 
indicated that it would make examining rollovers a priority for 2014, and 
would focus on investment advisers who encourage people to roll funds over 
to investments with higher fees.38 However, two years later, the SEC still has 
taken no action.  
 
A. FEES   
 From an economics perspective, fees are an important issue in 
pension rollovers—not just the fees of the investment products, but also the 
advisory fees of fiduciary advisers advising participants to roll over their 
funds to accounts the adviser would manage. In 20 years, a fee of 50 basis 
points (0.5 percent) reduces a portfolio with a 4 percent annual return by 
$10,000 compared to a fee of 25 basis points, while the reduction is $30,000 
if the fee is 100 basis points.39 
In comparing the fees of IRAs and 401(k) plans, the question is not 
whether an IRA can be constructed that provides lower fees than 401(k) 
plans. Rather, the question is whether the IRAs that people actually have 
                                                                                                                 
36 See Manganaro, supra note 35. 
37 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Fact Sheet: Department of Labor Finalizes Rule to 
Address Conflicts of Interest in Retirement Advice, Saving Middle Class Families 
Billions of Dollars Every Year”, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-
ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/dol-final-rule-to-address-conflicts-
of-interest-pdf. 
38 Fred Reish et al., FINRA’s Reminder About Rollovers: News to Many, RET. 
INCOME TEAM NEWSLETTER, http://files.drinkerbiddle.com/files/ftpupload/ 
MemosandNewsletters/Retirement-Income-Team-Newsletter_Article-2.pdf. 
39 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, How Fees and Expenses Affect Your 
Investment Portfolio, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_fees_expenses.pdf.   
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generally charge lower fees than the 401(k) plans they formerly had.  In 
aggregate, fees are lower in 401(k) plans than in IRAs. In 2014, fees were 58 
basis points for an asset-weighted average of 401(k) plans and 74 basis points 
for the asset-weighted average of equity mutual funds held in IRAs.40 
 Some workers changing jobs or retiring may be able to reduce the 
fees they pay by moving from a 401(k) plan to an IRA. Such a worker may 
be in a 401(k) plan with no low-fee options. For example, the 401(k) plan 
for the nonprofit firm Demos in 2012 did not offer any investment options 
with an expense ratio of less than 70 basis points.41 A worker may also face 
higher fees if he has several small accounts than if he rolls over those 
accounts into a single account, such as an IRA or a subsequent employer’s 
401(k) plan. For example, some accounts charge fixed fees for small account 
balances.  
 Thus, a rollover may be good advice in some circumstances, but it 
generally is not.42 Most 401(k) participants are in large plans, but a minority 
are in small plans. In 2013, 9.8 million participants were in plans with less 
than 100 participants, while 54.7 million participants were in plans with 100 
or more participants.43 Fees tend to be higher in smaller 401(k) plans than in 
larger ones. A study of 401(k) fees has found that, because of economies of 
scale, plans with more total assets and with more assets per participant tend 
to have lower fees.44 Thus, on the basis of fees, a rollover to an IRA is more 
likely to be beneficial if it comes from a 401(k) plan that has a small number 
of employees and that has relatively small account balances.  
                                                                                                                 
40 Abbey & Reid, supra note 31. 
41 ROBERT HILTONSMITH, THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS DRAIN: THE HIDDEN & 
EXCESSIVE COSTS OF 401(K)S 5 (2012). 
42 Nancy Anderson, 7 Reasons Not To Rollover Your Orphan 401(K) To An 
IRA, FORBES (2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/financialfinesse/2012/07/10/are-
your-401k-investments-worth-their-cost/; See also John A. Turner and Bruce W. 
Klein, Retirement Savings Flows and Financial Advice: Should You Roll Over Your 
401(k) Plan?, Benefits Quarterly 30: Fourth Quarter (2014), 42-54. The fees in these 
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based statistic.  
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Fees vary considerably across 401(k) plans. One study found that 10 
percent of the 130 plans in the study had an “all-in” fee, which includes 
administrative fees, of 0.37 percent of assets or less, while 10 percent had an 
“all-in” fee of 1.71 percent or more, with an average of 0.72 percent.45 In an 
update of that study, 10 percent of the 525 plans surveyed had an “all-in” fee 
of 0.28 percent of assets, while 10 percent had an “all-in” fee of 1.38 percent 
of assets.46 These statistics compare to an average fee for equity mutual funds 
for retail investors of 0.79 percent (79 basis points) and 0.62 percent (62 
basis points) in bond funds.47  
 Some 401(k) plans offer very low fee options that are not available 
to participants in IRAs. In particular, some plans provide options that are 
institutionally priced rather than retail priced.  Institutional pricing is the 
reduced pricing that sponsors of defined benefit plans have, which is 
sometimes extended for some investment options to participants in the 
401(k) plan of the employer. For example, an institutionally priced equity 
index fund that a plan sponsor’s defined benefit plan uses could charge fees 
as low as 6 basis points to 401(k) plan participants of that plan sponsor. In 
some 401(k) plans, the plan sponsor pays the administrative fees, whereas in 
an IRA those fees are the individual’s responsibility. According to the 
consulting firm AonHewitt, “[w]ithin the defined contribution system, plan 
participants not only generally have access to high-quality investment 
options at reasonable prices (through lower-cost institutional fund products 
such as collective trusts and separate account vehicles), but also benefit from 
fiduciary protections. Workers cannot obtain these benefits individually in 
the retail market.”48 The “retail market” refers to the IRA market and the 
market for private savings. Institutional shares account for 43 percent of the 
equity mutual funds held in 401(k) plans.49 
 The financial incentives for financial firms to advise their clients to 
make rollovers are substantial. Even firms that manage clients’ 401(k) 
investments often advise their clients to roll those funds over to an IRA when 
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46 DELOITTE CONSULTING, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN FEES: A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE 
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48 AON HEWITT, LEAKAGE OF PARTICIPANTS’ DC ASSETS: HOW LOANS, 
WITHDRAWALS, AND CASHOUTS ARE ERODING RETIREMENT INCOME (2011), 
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49 INV. CO. INST., supra note 47, at 17. 
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they retire or leave their employers because the firms can make more money 
managing IRAs. Not only do financial advisers encourage rollovers, but so 
do record keepers for 401(k) plans that also provide mutual funds.  These 
record keepers advise participants who no longer work for the employer 
sponsoring the plan to roll their funds over to an IRA, which the record 
keepers would then manage.50 
 The fees for IRA participants may also include fees for financial 
advice because many people are not financially sophisticated and feel as if 
they need assistance in managing their accounts, especially when faced with 
the large number of options available to IRA participants. One large provider 
of financial advice charges fees of 1.5 percent for advisory services for 
account balances up to $500,000 on top of the investment fees the mutual 
funds in the account charge.51  
 As an example of bad advice, National Public Radio (“NPR”) 
documented the case of a woman who was advised to roll over her 401(k) 
plan to an IRA. The adviser told her that the rollover would not result in her 
paying any extra fees. When NPR analyzed her financial documents relating 
to the rollover, it found that the adviser had invested her money into mutual 
funds that charge load fees of 5.75 percent, causing her to lose nearly 6 
percent of her retirement savings.52  
 
IV. THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN (TSP) ROLLOVERS TO IRAS 
 Financial advisers are advising clients to roll funds over from good, 
low-fee defined contribution plans to higher-fee IRAs. The case of the Thrift 
Savings Plan is a particularly dramatic example. The TSP is a 401(k)-type 
defined contribution plan for federal government workers, the military, and 
members of Congress. The TSP is the largest pension fund, in terms of assets, 
                                                                                                                 
50 John A. Turner & Kathy K. Perry, Protecting Pension Participates: 
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in the United States.53 Its assets are more than 10 times as large as the largest 
private-sector defined contribution plan, which is sponsored by IBM.54  
 The TSP charges extremely low fees—the lowest fees of any plan in 
the United States. In  2015, the fees for all the TSP funds, including the 
international stock fund and the target date funds, were 2.9 basis points or 
less.55 The fees in 2013 were less than one-twentieth the average cost of a 
stock index fund and less than one-thirtieth the average cost of target date 
funds.56 In 2014, the TSP fees compared to 83 basis points as the participant-
weighted average for a survey of 401(k) plans, 58 basis points for the asset-
weighted average of 401(k) plans, and 74 basis points for the asset-weighted 
average of equity mutual funds held in IRAs.57  A survey by Morningstar, an 
investment research firm based in Chicago, finds that the asset-weighted 
average of all mutual funds, excluding money market funds and funds of 
funds (FOFs), such as target date funds, was 64 basis points in 2014.58 For 
passively managed funds it was 20 basis points, and for actively managed 
funds it was 79 basis points.59 That study finds that over time, investors on 
average have moved to lower-fee funds, which is the reverse of what happens 
when TSP participants roll over their accounts to an IRA.60 The TSP’s fees 
are low primarily because of its large size, but in part because some 
administrative costs are borne directly by the federal government, and in part 
because, as an employer-sponsored plan, it does not engage in advertising.61   
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 Despite the TSP’s extremely low fees, some participants are being 
advised to roll their TSP funds over to managed investment accounts in 
IRAs, sometimes resulting in as much as a seventy-fold increase in fees 
(from 3 basis points to 230 basis points). A survey of TSP participants who 
made a withdrawal in 2013 found that an estimated 16,400 participants 
(about one-third of those making withdrawals) withdrew all or part of their 
TSP account because they were advised by their financial adviser to do so.62  
A telephone survey study that asked financial advisers for advice concerning 
TSP rollovers found that advisers generally advised the callers to make a 
rollover, despite the very low fees in the TSP. That advice on average cost 
participants approximately $20,000 in present value of increased fees.63 
 
V. UNITED KINGDOM—THE PENSION MIS-SELLING 
SCANDAL64 
 
 The United Kingdom also has had experience with people being 
advised to roll over from good, employer-provided pension plans to higher-
fee individual account pension plans. That episode is known in the U.K. as 
the “pension mis-selling scandal.”65 The “pension mis-selling scandal” is the 
term used in the United Kingdom to refer to the situation in which many 
people were advised to switch their pension plans from employer-provided 
defined benefit pension plans to individual account pensions in instances 
where those changes were in the financial interest of the adviser, but with 
little effort made to determine whether the advice was suitable for the client.  
In 1988, a regulatory change expanded eligibility for personal 
pensions from just the self-employed to all employees. This change 
presented financial service providers with an opportunity.  As part of a 
deregulation of financial products, individuals were permitted to choose 
personal pensions instead of participating in the earnings-related part of 
social security (SERPS—the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme) or in 
employer-provided plans that had been used for “contracting out” of that part 
of social security. 
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63 Turner, Klein & Stein, supra note 12.  
64 In the U.K., it is spelled “mis-selling”. See Dana Muir, Regulation and 
Personal Pensions, in PERSONAL CHOICE IN THE PROVISION OF RETIREMENT 
INCOME: MEETING THE NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE? (Gerard Hughes & Jim Stewart 
eds., 2009). 
65 Ward, supra note 16. 
278 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 
 
 Firms responded by rewarding new, untrained sales forces with sales 
incentives to capture market share. These incentives were awarded for 
making direct sales of financial products to consumers who were unfamiliar 
with those financial products. Insurance salesmen targeted groups like nurses 
and steelworkers who were in good defined benefit plans but who were 
nonetheless encouraged to roll those plan funds over to personal pensions 
that provided lower benefits.66 These factors created an environment in 
which aggressive sales practices thrived.67 
 The mis-selling of personal pensions from 1988 to 1994 resulted in 
the regulatory review of sales of pension products to almost 2 million 
customers and in extensive regulatory change.  During that six-year period, 
people had been encouraged by financial services companies and advisers, 
and through a large advertising campaign by financial services companies, 
to switch their pension arrangements from employer-sponsored defined 
benefit plans to individual account plans, only to end up receiving lower 
benefits as a result.68   
Due to reports of advisers not complying with regulatory standards 
in the sale of personal pensions, in 1992 the government regulator, the 
Securities and Investments Board (SIB), reviewed a sample of the records 
associated with personal pension sales and found that only 9 percent 
substantially complied with regulatory rules.69  The SIB later became part of 
a new agency called the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which has since 
been replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority. The SIB commissioned a 
study of industry practices that found “widespread regulatory compliance 
failure”.70  
 The British media were highly critical of the insurance companies 
involved in the mis-selling scandal. The BBC reported that Prudential 
(U.K.), which it cited as one of the worst offenders in the mis-selling scandal, 
had set aside £1.1 billion to pay for claims related to the scandal. This 
implicit admission of guilt followed an earlier statement by the company’s 
CEO in 1994 expressing “total reassurance” that Prudential was not guilty of 
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pension mis-selling. In 2002, the BBC reported that more than one million 
customers would receive compensation for being victims of pension mis-
selling and the total cost would be at least £11.8 billion, with the financial 
market regulator taking disciplinary action against 346 firms.71 
 The concern with mis-selling focused on the sale of personal 
pensions, by both insurance companies and independent financial advisers, 
to employees who then opted out of an employer-provided pension plan. 
Two factors caused employer-provided pension plans to be better 
arrangements than personal pensions for most individuals.  First, employers 
typically contributed to plans they sponsored but did not contribute to 
personal pensions.  Second, the benefits formula of an employer-provided 
plan typically was more generous than the investment growth in a personal 
pension.72 
 Nobles and Black attribute pensions mis-selling in the U.K. to 
failures both by regulators and by the firms involved in mis-selling.73  They 
argue that until the 1992 SIB audit, regulators failed to focus their efforts on 
personal pensions as a product line.  Instead the regulators suffered from a 
lack of expertise with personal pensions, which represented a new line of 
financial products.74  The regulators established review processes that tended 
to focus at the firm level and on the activities of the internal firm monitors. 
In a government inquiry into the cause of mis-selling, the FSA indicated that 
the multiple regulators experienced coordination problems in determining 
the responsibilities of the different regulators.75  
 In 2006, the FSA took further action to deal with investment product 
mis-selling, with those new rules coming fully into force in 2012. Despite 
the existence of a best-interest or fiduciary standard—meaning the adviser 
must act in the best interest of the client—continued problems with 
investment mis-selling were observed, leading to the implementation of the 
new rules. Previously, financial advisers receiving commissions for making 
recommendations concerning pensions to clients had an obligation to make 
recommendations in the best interest of the client, but it had become clear 
that, because of commissions that caused a conflict of interest for the 
advisers, this approach was not working. These regulatory changes improved 
the transparency of fees and eliminated the practice of mutual funds and 
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other financial intermediaries paying commissions to advisers that 
recommend their products.76   
 These rules in the United Kingdom thus differ from the approach 
taken in the U.S. Department of Labor regulations of 2016, discussed later, 
which do not prohibit advisers from receiving commissions, so long as they 
act in the best interest of their clients.77 The United Kingdom previously had 
taken the approach used by the U.S. Department of Labor but found that the 
incentives embedded in that approach were sufficiently strong—and 
presumably the enforcement sufficiently weak—to cause that approach to 
not provide adequate protection for pension participants. 
 The new U.K. rules require advisers to receive their income solely 
by charging their clients fees for their services. This approach reduces 
conflicts of interest that advisers have with respect to the choice of financial 
products to sell. It has the further advantage of making the compensation 
advisers receive more transparent. This reform was enacted because the 
receipt of commissions has been viewed as a root cause of the pension mis-
selling scandal in the United Kingdom.  
 The U.K. pension mis-selling scandal was much more visible to 
participants and plan sponsors than the scandal in the United States, where, 
despite the CEA’s report, so far is largely invisible. In the United Kingdom, 
the scandal involved a switch from defined benefit plans with clearly 
determinable benefits to defined contribution plans that were required to 
provide benefits as annuities. Initial concern about the situation was 
expressed by plan sponsors, with that concern leading to a study by the 
financial regulator, which ultimately documented mis-selling.78  
 The SIB, the U.K. financial markets regulator at the time, issued 
guidance to participants, stating that “it is nearly always best for you” to stay 
with your employer’s plan rather than rolling those funds over into an 
individual account plan.79 While such advice would probably also apply in 
the United States, the U.S. regulators have not given that advice. 
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 The situation in the United States involves a switch from defined 
contribution plans to IRAs, in which the comparison with the former plan’s 
benefits is difficult for participants to make because it is not as clear what 
they would have received had they stayed in the former plan. Perhaps as a 
consequence, there appear to be no complaints by people about bad advice 
they have received encouraging a rollover to an IRA. If participants were 
aware of the importance of fees in determining financial outcomes, the 
comparison would not be so difficult, but with the low level of financial 
literacy of many people, many participants do not understand the importance 
of fees. 
 A lesson from the experience of the United Kingdom is that the 
financial service industry may take advantage of unsophisticated pension 
participants in selling them expensive pensions when more suitable, lower-
fee pensions are available to them. Pension participants need regulatory 
protection.  
 
VI. THE SEC 
This section considers the regulatory oversight provided by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) related to fees charged in 
connection to pension rollovers, reasons why that oversight appears to be 
weak, and the views of the SEC concerning the level of fees charged by 
advisers as a fiduciary or regulatory issue. 
 
A. THE SEC AND THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD 
 
As a result of the conflict of interest of financial advisers, 
government has stepped in through the SEC to regulate financial advice in 
order to protect the interests of investors. This regulation involves imposing 
a fiduciary standard, which requires that the advice be the best advice for the 
client.80 However, over time broker-dealers have increasingly provided 
advice, but the SEC has not required that they register as RIAs.81  
                                                                                                                 
80 Unless otherwise indicated, we are referring to the SEC fiduciary standard. 
Different organizations have different fiduciary standards, as discussed later in the 
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81 Michael Kitces, Is the SEC Failing to Enforce the ‘Solely Incidental’ Advice 
Exemption for Broker-Dealers Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940?, NERD’S 
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 In 2008, the SEC first considered updating its fiduciary standard. 
Christopher Cox, chairman of the SEC at the time, has stated that updating 
the standard “is harder than perhaps it ought to be.” He noted, “There are 
enormous interests at stake here.” The 2016 chairwoman of the SEC, Mary 
Shapiro, has stated that the SEC has had “hundreds of meetings” and that a 
task force is working on a proposed rule, but that its efforts only resulted in 
a study.82   
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 requires the SEC to undertake a study of the adequacy of consumer 
protections regarding financial advice. The study is to assess whether there 
should be a uniform standard of conduct for broker-dealers and RIAs. In 
2011, the SEC staff released that report, Study on Investment Advisers and 
Broker-Dealers.83 The report recommended extending the fiduciary standard 
that applies to investment advisers to include broker-dealers. However, the 
SEC has not acted on those recommendations, even though more than five 
years have passed since the report was released. In March 2015, the SEC 
indicated that it would move toward a uniform standard for broker-dealers 
and RIAs, but it has provided no indication of the time frame in which it 
would do that.84  
 The Consumer Federation of America has noted that despite years 
of entreaties from consumer advocates, the SEC has done nothing to protect 
investors in this area. It has failed to propose, let alone finalize, new rules.85 
While rule-making in this area is not required by the Dodd-Frank Act, rule-
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making in other areas is required, and as of December 31, 2015, the SEC had 
failed to meet Dodd-Frank deadlines on 22 percent of its required rules.86 
 The SEC has been criticized in other contexts for its deference to the 
industry it regulates. For example, it has been criticized for its handling of 
the bankruptcies of Enron in 2001 and of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and for 
its handling of the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme (which cost investors $50 
billion) in 2009.87  
 The SEC regulates RIAs, holding them to a fiduciary standard. The 
literature on the regulation of RIAs often focuses on the problem called “hat 
switching,” where an adviser will sometimes act as a broker-dealer, with a 
suitability standard, and sometimes act as a RIA, with a fiduciary standard 
for conduct.88 While the “hat switching” problem is a serious problem, it is 
not the main problem with respect to advice concerning pension rollovers. 
The main problem is the lack of action by the SEC.  
 
B. THE SEC, THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD, AND FEES 
 
The SEC appears to consider fees charged by advisers to not be an 
important issue in the context of pension rollovers. On its website, the SEC 
provides information as to the options a person has when changing jobs. It 
provides information on the option of rollovers from a 401(k) plan to an IRA, 
but it does not mention that the person should consider the level of fees in 
the new plan versus the old plan.  
It also fails to mention that the person generally has the option of 
leaving the money in the 401(k) plan of his or her former employer, thus 
biasing the person’s decision toward the other options, including a rollover 
to an IRA. It further biases the decision by noting that for the rollover to an 
IRA, but not for other options, your money “can continue to grow over time, 
giving you more income to live on in retirement.”  
We sought to obtain further information from the SEC concerning 
its views on the importance of fees in the rollover decision. To assess the 
SEC’s views on the fiduciary standard and the importance of fees, we asked 
the SEC through its online contact portal the following question: “If a 
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Registered Investment Adviser advises a client to roll over his or her 401(k) 
account to an IRA that the adviser would manage, are the management fees 
charged by the adviser taken into account when analyzing whether this 
advice meets the fiduciary standard?” The SEC declined to provide an 
answer to the question, replying that it does not answer hypothetical 
questions.   
 We then presented an actual situation where someone was advised 
to roll funds over from the TSP by an adviser that charges a management fee 
of 200 basis points, which raised the fees paid by that individual by more 
than 70 times. The SEC again declined to provide an answer, saying that it 
does not comment on specific cases and that we should consult with an 
attorney. In addition, we filed a complaint with the SEC concerning that 
particular case, but the SEC never responded to the complaint.  
 It appears that the SEC does not take into account the fees charged 
by advisers when considering whether the advice of the adviser meets the 
fiduciary standard, as long as the adviser has clearly disclosed the fees. That 
approach considerably weakens the protection provided by the fiduciary 
standard. An adviser can thus provide advice that is clearly not in the best 
interest of the client if fees are taken into account, so long as the adviser 
discloses the fees.  
Thus, merely by disclosing the fees, an adviser can satisfy the 
fiduciary requirement of acting in the best interest of the client. To give a 
specific example, an adviser can advise rolling over assets from the TSP, 
which charges fees of less than 3 basis points, to a plan managed by the 
adviser that charges 200 basis points for the management fee, and that advice 
can meet the standard of being in the best interest of the client if the adviser 
discloses the fees.  
 The SEC thus places considerable reliance on the disclosures of 
financial advisers. Surveys of investors, however, indicate that most 
investors find the disclosures of financial advisers to be difficult to 
understand. Investors also feel that financial advisers do not spend sufficient 
time helping them understand the disclosures.89  
 The SEC has taken a weak position on other issues relating to fees. 
For example, in 2012, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC released 
new rules to protect investors concerning income and asset thresholds at 
which advisers could charge performance-based fees.90 However, it greatly 
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weakened the effect of those rules by grandfathering in all persons affected 
by the old rules.   
  The SEC has announced that it intends to propose a new fiduciary 
rule that would extend its current fiduciary rule to broker-dealers, perhaps as 
early as April 2017.91 While this would be a step in the right direction, its 
fiduciary standard is so weak that it would not provide much protection for 
pension participants or other investors. 
 
C. EXPLANATIONS FOR WEAK OVERSIGHT  
 
The SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations has 
enforcement authority. However, because of a decrease in the number of 
staff in that office owing to a reduction in congressionally approved funding, 
the number of examinations has declined, presumably resulting in a 
weakening of enforcement by the SEC.92 Furthermore, the Consumer 
Federation of America points out that even when a fiduciary duty applies, 
the SEC has shown little inclination to enforce it.93 
 Because of the large amount of money at stake for financial advisers, 
they have attempted to influence the regulators.  Such influence is sometimes 
referred to when it is successful as “regulatory capture” or “regulatory 
influence.” One way the SEC may be influenced is through the “revolving 
door” of government.  Former SEC employees must file post-government 
employment statements if they plan to represent a client before the 
Commission within two years of leaving the SEC.  The Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request for all post-employment statements filed by former SEC employees 
between 2006 and 2010. It found that between 2006 and 2010, 219 former 
SEC employees filed 789 post-employment statements indicating their intent 
to represent an outside client before the Commission.94 The Dodd-Frank Act 
raised salaries at the SEC, and at other federal financial regulatory agencies, 
compared to those at other agencies in the federal government, in order to 
attract and retain qualified staff at the financial regulatory agencies. For 
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example, staff at the SEC in 2016 could earn up to $237,700, depending on 
where they were working.95 The previously mentioned study refers to the 
period before that change, but the effect of that change is not known at this 
time. 
The SEC is a stand-alone regulatory entity, whereas the Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, which has responsibility for protecting 
pension participants, is part of a larger agency, the DOL.  This difference in 
administrative structure may be part of the explanation for why the SEC is 
weaker than the Employee Benefits Security Administration with respect to 
independence from industry influence.96   
 
D. THE FEC AND THE SEC  
 
 The Federal Elections Commission (FEC) may account for part of 
the explanation for the weak oversight provided by the SEC: it may be due 
to the election campaign contributions of the financial services industry to 
members of Congress, who then favor weak oversight by the SEC.  Over the 
2013–2014 election cycle, the financial services industry spent $1.4 billion. 
More than 340 financial service companies and trade associations each spent 
more than $500,000 during this period. Of the total spending, $497 million 
was spent on contributions to federal candidates and $908 million was spent 
on lobbying. The contributions to federal candidates were split unevenly 
between the two parties, with 63 percent going to Republicans and 37 percent 
going to Democrats. The financial sector’s campaign contributions were 
more than twice that of any other business sector.97 Thus, regulatory capture 
can occur both at the agency level and at the level of Congress through 
financing congressional election campaigns. 
 
E. THE SEC AND COMPLAINTS  
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A person receiving bad advice from a financial adviser concerning a 
rollover could file a complaint with the SEC. The SEC website, however, is 
not “user-friendly” to pension participants filing a complaint. The link on the 
SEC website to “Enforcement” would be the most obvious path to follow. 
But instead, a person must file a complaint under the link to “Education”—
that’s if they persist sufficiently in searching through the links on the website 
to find that link; “Education” would seem to be one of the least likely places 
to file a complaint. Even after the person has found the right page, it is not 
set up for easily dealing with complaints concerning advice on pension 
rollover.  
 
VII. TWO ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
This section briefly considers two alternatives to the hypothesis of 
regulatory capture as explanations for the weak oversight provided by the 
SEC. First, the SEC may not consider the issue of pension rollovers to be in 
its bailiwick, but rather, it may hold that issue to be the responsibility of the 
DOL. But contrary to that view, some members of Congress have argued 
that the SEC, not the DOL, should have jurisdiction in this issue.98 In 
addition, opponents of the DOL fiduciary regulations have argued that point 
in court.99 Second, the SEC may feel that if it were to bring cases in this area, 
it would not prevail in court. Presumably, if the SEC had that opinion it 
would favor stronger regulations, but it has not taken that position. 
 
VIII. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REGULATIONS  
In the absence of action by the SEC, the DOL in 2016 promulgated 
a fiduciary rule that provides some protection for private-sector pension 
participants.100 The rule explicitly provides fiduciary protection to pension 
participants for advice from a financial adviser to roll funds over to an IRA. 
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The rule arguably would protect all pension participants, including 
government employees, when they are advised concerning a rollover to an 
IRA. Before the DOL promulgated this regulation, Republicans in Congress 
sought to block it by introducing a bill, the Retail Investor Protection Act, 
that would prohibit the DOL from finalizing its rule until 30 days after the 
SEC had finalized a rule.101  The Republicans presumably made this move 
because they recognized the low probability that the SEC would act.    
 Despite its inaction, at least one of the SEC’s five commissioners 
has criticized the attempt of the DOL to deal with pension mis-selling.102 
According to a report released by Republicans in the House of 
Representatives, the SEC opposes the DOL proposed regulation. The DOL 
has denied the substance of that report, while the SEC has refused to 
comment on it.103 
The DOL has been criticized for regulating in an area outside of its 
expertise, and a lawsuit has been filed against the department arguing that 
rulemaking in this area should be done by the SEC.104  
The regulations do not protect pension participants from generalized 
bad advice, such as advertisements that encourage participants to roll over 
your old 401(k) plan because “the future you envision for yourself matters 
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to us.”105 That advice generally results in pension participants paying higher 
fees and having fewer regulatory protections.106 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The SEC has not taken any action concerning financial advice to roll 
over from low-fee 401(k) plans to higher fee IRAs. The lack of action by the 
SEC stands in stark contrast to the situation in the United Kingdom, where 
the type of advice people received to roll funds over to substantially higher-
fee pensions is considered to be a scandal and was addressed more than a 
decade ago by the U.K. financial market regulators. 
The SEC appears to not consider the fees charged by financial 
advisers to be an important issue. It does not include fees as an issue in its 
advice to people considering rollovers from 401(k) plans to IRAs. It has, to 
our knowledge, never brought a case against a financial adviser concerning 
fees relating to pension rollovers, even in the extreme case of rollovers from 
the TSP, which charges less than 3 basis points. The CEA has concluded that 
bad advice concerning pension rollovers is costing U.S. pension participants 
$17 billion, but the SEC thus far has not considered this to be an issue that 
would warrant action on its part. The CEA study indicates that pension mis-
selling, in which financial advisers have advised pension participants to 
switch from relatively low-fee 401(k) plans to higher-fee IRAs, has occurred 
on a widespread basis in the United States.   
 With more responsibility placed on individuals to invest their 
retirement assets when they leave an employer’s 401(k) plan, workers often 
rely on investment advisers but are often not well-served by them. In this 
paper, we compare the regulatory protections pension investors receive in 
the United Kingdom to those that have been provided by the SEC relating to 
advice concerning pension rollovers. Although the SEC holds RIAs to a 
fiduciary standard, and the literature on advice has expressed concern about 
the weakening of that protection because of the so-called “hat switching” 
problem, the more serious problem is that the SEC does not apply the 
fiduciary standard to advice provided by RIAs concerning pension rollovers. 
While the DOL has promulgated regulations in this area, those regulations 
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in 2016 are being challenged in court, in part on the basis that this area should 
be the responsibility of the SEC. 
 While we have addressed one aspect of the issue of bad advice 
concerning pension rollovers, other issues also warrant addressing. For 
example, the advice contained in the mutual fund industry advertising 
campaign to “roll over your old 401(k)” is bad advice for many participants 
and does not come with disclaimers. That advice campaign is treated by the 
regulators as sales and marketing, rather than advice. Because most 
participants have encountered this advice many times, and presumably many 
roll their funds over based on that advice, the protections that this paper 
indicates are needed may still be weak in that there are no regulations on this 
type of generalized advice—generally bad advice that comes without 
disclaimers.   
 
 
 
 
